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I. ST ATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This dispute arises out of two water loss claims made by Plaintiff/Appellant, Roger

Daniel Rizzo ("Rizzo") under a Defendant/Respondent State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's
("State Farm") homeowners policy of insurance. Both claims were for water damage to the
basement of his home. 1 State Farm denied both claims because the homeowner's policy does not
insure under any coverage any loss that was caused in whole or in part by surface water or water
below the surface of the ground, including water which exerts pressure on, or seeps or leaks
through a building or foundation.
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment agreeing there was no coverage for
these water damage claims and dismissing all causes of action in the Amended Complaint.
Rizzo also appeals from the denial of his motion to amend his complaint to include various new
causes of action and a claim for punitive damages. He further appeals from the granting of State
Farm's motion for protective order against certain discovery.

1

For the first time in this litigation Rizzo has introduced a third claim for water damage
alleged to have occurred on January 19,2012. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-19; 45-46.) This third
claim is for alleged water damage to both his home and personal property. !d. This third claim
was never part of this litigation. It did not occur until after the district court granted summary
judgment dismissing Rizzo's Amended Complaint. (R., p.847 (summary judgment granted on
January 9, 2012); Appellant's Brief, p. 17.) Rizzo did not seek a motion to amend to add this
third claim. It is black letter law that a party cannot bring a new claim for the first time on
appeal. Wattenburger v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 324, 246 P.3d 961, 977
(2010).
-1-

B.

Course of Proceedings.
State Farm adds the following to clarify, add to and/or correct Rizzo's Course of

Proceedings:
1.

On February 24, 2011, Mrs. Rizzo was dismissed as a plaintiff to the action. (R.,
pp. 481-82.)

2.

On July 8, 2011, this Court denied Rizzo's Motion for Permission to File an
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. (R., pp. 574-77.)

3.

On January 12,2012, State Farm offered a proposed judgment with the following
language - "Attorney fees and costs of litigation respecting the claim asserted by
Roger Daniel Rizzo, if any, will be assessed and ordered in a manner consistent
with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." (R., p. 859.)

4.

On January 17, 2012, Rizzo objected to the form of the proposed judgment on the
grounds that the proposed judgment awarded attorney fees and costs to State
Farm. (R., pp. 859-61.) The proposed judgment did not so indicate. The district
court had not granted attorney fees so State Farm. None had been requested
because there was not yet a judgment.

5.

A hearing on the objection to the proposed judgment was held on February 14,
2012. (R., p. 6.)

6.

On January 27, 2012, Rizzo, before any form of judgment was entered,
prematurely filed his Notice of Appeal. (R., pp. 869-74.)

7.

On February 14, 2012 the district court overruled Rizzo's objections to the form
of the judgment. (R., p. 6.)

8.

On February 15,2012 the final judgment was entered. (R., pp. 882-83.)

9.

Even after judgment was entered State Farm did not request attorney fees or costs,
nor did the district court order attorney fees against Plaintiff as represented by
Appellant. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 10, 12.)

10.

State Farm does not agree with Rizzo's commentary on, nor characterization of,
the proceedings, especially as they relate to the motions filed and the results
thereof. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 10-12.) State Farm notes that many of the
-2-

statements by Rizzo regarding these motions are not supported by or in the record
at all, including his characterization of the district court's state of mind. /d.
11.

C.

State Farm strenuously disagrees with Rizzo's "opinion" that Judge Hansen has
violated any Canon of Judicial Conduct, or that he is biased, or that he be
"sanctioned." (/d. at p. 12.) To the extent appropriate, State Farm hereby moves
to strike these remarks from the Appellant's Brief.

Concise Statement of Facts.
State Farm is unable to agree with Rizzo's "Relevant Facts" because: (1) they are too

intertwined with self-serving statements, many of which are without any record support; (2) he
has referred to documents that are not in the record (not even the entire district court file to which
Rizzo has so vehemently objected); 2 (3) he has referred to exhibits attached to his brief that are
not in the record; 3 (4) he has added a third claim for which there is no record support
whatsoever; 4 and (5) he has referred to documents, conversations and actions that occurred after
summary judgment was granted and after he filed his Notice of Appeal and are not in the record. 5
Finally, Rizzo's discussion of the relevance of "three types of evidence" he attached as exhibits
to his Brief is neither relevant nor concise nor a statement of facts. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-

2

See Appellant's Brief, p. 14, references to June 5 and June 8, 2010 letters. Rizzo's
record citations are to his own affidavit testimony describing those letters but the letters are not
in the record.
3

Exhibits 5, 7, 8 and 9 are different versions of the equivalent documents in the record or
have handwriting that does not appear in the record version.
4

Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-19; 45-46. See also footnote 1, infra.

5

Summary judgment was granted on January 9, 2012 (R., pp. 847-58) and Rizzo filed his
Notice of Appeal on January 27,2012. (R., pp. 869-74.) Rizzo refers to documents and events
occurring on January 19, 2012, Febmary 6, 7 and 19, 2012. (See Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-19.)
-3-

22. The district court based its decision to dismiss Rizzo's complaint on a matter of lawRizzo's claims were excluded from coverage. (R., pp. 847-858.) Rizzo's physical and mental
state, his unfortunate motorcycle accident, and his commendable volunteer work have nothing to
do with the issues on appeal. 6
State Farm offers the following concise statement of actual facts:
Roger and Eva Rizzo's home was damaged by water entering their basement on Saturday,
May 22, 2010 and December 29, 2010. (R., pp. 684-85.) At the time of the losses, the Rizzos'
home was insured by State Farm policy no. 12-B5-3574-2 (the "Policy"). (R., pp. 386-426.) The
Policy has an exclusion for water damage caused by surface water or water below the surface of
the ground. (R., p. 411.)
On May 24, 2010, a claim was submitted to State Farm and claim number 12-B042-840
was opened (the "May Claim"). (R., p. 375.) Donna Hoyne, a State Farm claim representative,
was assigned to investigate and evaluate the loss. (R., p. 377.) On May 25, 2010, Donna Hoyne
conducted an onsite inspection of the basement of Rizzo's home. (R., p. 378.) In one of the
window wells, plastic sheeting and a sump pump had been installed. (R., pp. 378-79.) Ms.
Hoyne's investigation determined that the water did not enter through the window itself but that
the water went down the outside of the basement wall and came in through the foundation at the

6

Moreover, most of this discussion is not supported by the record, is based on exhibits
that are different versions than contained in the record, or is based on erroneous citations to the
record. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-22.)
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floor level. (/d.) Based upon the information compiled through the investigation and an analysis
of the Policy, State Farm denied the May Claim on June 10, 2010. (R., p. 380.)
On November 24, 2010, the Rizzos filed their Complaint. (R., pp. 8-21.)
On December 29, 2010, the Rizzos reported a second water intrusion in the basement of
their home (the "December Claim"). (R., p. 329.) A new claim number was assigned and the
following day, Claim Representative Eric Vane was assigned the claim. (R., p. 428.) Mr. Vane's
investigation determined that the water from the December Claim entered the home at the joint
between the South Wall and the basement floor. (R., pp. 724; 851.) After concluding the
investigation Mr. Vane sent the Rizzos a formal denial letter for the December Claim. (R., pp.
754-58.)

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The appellate rules contemplate that Respondent set forth "additional" issues presented
on appeal if the issues listed in Appellant's Brief are insufficient, incomplete or raise additional
issues for review. I.A.R., Rule 35(b)(4). Consistent with Rizzo's Notice of Appeal, Rizzo fails
to list any issues on appeal. Instead, he lists the various decisions and orders from which he
appeals. (Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) State Farm will attempt to set forth those issues on appeal
Rizzo did not set forth.
1.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing the Amended

Complaint on the grounds that (a) State Farm did not meet its burden of proof; (b) the district
court failed to follow Rule 56(c) standards; (c) the district court lacked a basis for making certain
factual conclusions; or (d) the district court was wrong as a matter of law.
-5-

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the

complaint?
3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting the motion for protective

order?
State Farm offers the following additional issue on appeal:
1.

Is State Farm entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-

1839(4) for Rizzo's bringing and pursuing a frivolous, unreasonable and/or unsupportable
appeal?

III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review on Appeal
1.

Standard of Review for Grant of Summary Judgment.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as
the district court's standard in ruling upon the motion. Thomson v. Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,
475-476, 50 P.3d 488,490-491 (2002). Thus, this Court will review the record before the district
court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine de

novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there
exists any genuine issues of material fact and whether the successful movant below is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Tusch Enterprise v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026
(1987); I.R.C.P. 56(c).
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2.

Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation Issues

The interpretation of the legal effect of a policy of insurance is a question of law over
which this Court exercises de novo review. Howard v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214,
46 P.3d 510, (2002). Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination and effect of
a contractual provision is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Tolley v. T.H.l. Co., 140
Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). Interpreting contracts and applying law to undisputed facts
constitutes matters of law which this Court also reviews de novo. Fisk v. Royal Carribean

Cruises, Ltd., 141 Idaho 290, 292, 108 P.3d 990, 992 (2004).

3.

Standard of Review for Denial of Motion to Amend

Whether to permit an amended pleading is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 (2002). In determining whether
an amended complaint should be allowed, the court may consider whether the new claim
proposed to be inserted into the action by the amended complaint state a valid claim or whether
the opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim. Spur Products

Corporation v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P.3d 300, 303 (2005). The district court
should decline to grant leave to amend where the amendment would be a futile act. Wells v.

United States Life Ins. Co. 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991).

4.

Standard of Review for Punitive Damages

A district court's determination that a Plaintiff is not entitled to amend the complaint to
add punitive damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion. St. Al 's Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI

Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 499, 224 P.3d 1068, 1088 (2009).
-7-

5.

Standard of Review for Granting Protective Order

The standard for reviewing a trial court's grant of a protective order is abuse of discretion.
Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357,956 P.2d 674 (1998).

B.

Analysis
1.

The District Court Correctly Followed Applicable Summary Judgment
Principles

The district court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c). When the material facts are undisputed a district court must determine whether
an insurance policy provides coverage as a matter of law. McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life
Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 44-5, 28 P.3d 380, 385-6 (2001). Here, the district court followed the
applicable standards and granted summary judgment on undisputed material facts and
determined, as a matter of law, there was no coverage for Rizzo's claims.
a.

State Farm Met Its Burden of Proof Showing the Absence of Genuine
Issues of Material Facts.

The district court properly focused on the material facts necessary to make its coverage
determination-- those relating to the cause of the water damage. (R., p. 849.) There was (or
could be) no dispute as to the cause of the damage. The water that entered the basement and
caused the damage was either surface water or water below the surface of the ground. !d. There
was no factual dispute as to the cause of the damage. 7 State Farm's motion for summary

7

Rizzo did dispute the form of the water that caused the damage but that was a legal issue.
-8-

judgment did not dispute but rather assumed all material facts in the light most favorable to
Rizzo. (R., p. 843.) ("The source/ location of the water entering the house is the only material
fact and because State Farm accepts all of Mr. Rizzo's alleged facts as tme, there are no disputed
material facts and this motion can be mled upon as a matter of law.") The district court
followed suit and mled on the same basis. (R., p. 849.) ("For purposes of summary judgment,
Defendant does not dispute this alleged cause of damage to Plaintiffs' home.")
Rizzo's own statements and evidence support the district court's conclusions relating to
the factual cause of the water damage. (R., pp. 848-51; 853.) Rizzo's own expert confirmed the
cause. /d. Rizzo presented no evidence of any other cause. /d. Although Rizzo disputes his
own statements and evidence; interprets certain documents differently; focuses on the form of the
water before it damaged his home; and adds other natural forces to the scenario (i.e., wind),
nothing can change the undisputed material facts that: (1) it was water that caused the damage;
(2) the rainwater hit the ground and accumulated before the home was damaged; and (3) the
portion of Rizzo's home damaged was his basement which, by definition, is below the surface of
the ground. That the water started as rain, hail, sleet or snow is immaterial. That the water
and/or dwelling were affected by wind is immaterial. The material facts are undisputed - the
water causing the damage was either surface water or water beneath the surface of the ground.
Part of the basis for State Farm's motion for summary judgment was there was no
genuine issue of material fact with regard to Rizzo's causes of action-- no coverage, no breach of
contract. The burden was on Rizzo to establish an issue of fact regarding this element of his
causes of action. See Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416, 420
-9-

( 1996). Rizzo failed to meet his burden of proof that there was a material issue of fact in dispute
regarding coverage/breach of contract. Whether the damage was caused by surface water
entering the basement or one or both or in combination with other causes there is no material
issue of fact because none of these leads to a covered loss. Alternatively, Rizzo presented no
evidence of any covered cause of the loss making any facts "in dispute" immaterial.
Rizzo's primary causes of action were for breach of contract and bad faith. 8 (R., pp. 69394; 695-96.) Both causes of action require, as an essential element, a covered claim and proof
that the insurance contract was breached. (See IDJI 6.0 1.1; 6.10.1 (contract), Robinson v. State
Fann Mutl. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 179, 45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002) (bad faith).) Facts in
dispute cease to be "material" facts when a Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. Garzee
v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774, 823 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 1992). When that happens, there
can be no "genuine issue of material fact" since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
!d. Rizzo cannot prove his water loss claims are covered under the Policy and therefore cannot
prove an essential element of either breach of contract or bad faith, making all facts allegedly in
dispute immaterial.
b.

Rizzo's "Expert" Witness Testimony and Opinions Were Either
Consistent With the District Court's Ruling or Were Immaterial.

The affidavit testimony and opinions of Rizzo's experts either supported the cause of the
water damage upon which the district court granted summary judgment or were immaterial.

8

He brought other causes of action which will be discussed below.
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Donald Flynn was Rizzo's causation expert. (R., pp. 848-49.) Mr. Flynn confirmed the
undisputed nature of the cause of water damage as surface or subsurface water (or, at a minimum,
confirmed the cause of the damage included one or both). !d. Therefore, his opinions and
testimony did not create a genuine issue of material fact or make the district court's legal rulings
wrong.
Stephen Strzelec was Rizzo's "standard in the industry" expert. (R., p. 550.) His
testimony was rendered immaterial when the prerequisite to bad faith (a breach of contract) was
dismissed. He was also offered as a "coverage" expert. However, the applicable policy language
was determined to be unambiguous and no expert testimony or opinion was needed regarding
coverage because it is an issue to be decided by the judge as a matter of law. Fisk, 141 Idaho at
292, 108 P.3d at 992. A district court is not obliged to accept an expert's testimony or opinions
on summary judgment where the opinion is within the obvious knowledge and experience of lay
persons. Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 54, 58, 454 P.2d 951, 955 (1969). Rizzo's experts did not
create a genuine issue of material fact or make the district court's legal rulings in error.
c.

The District Court Made No Factual Findings On Any Disputed Material
Issue of Fact.

Rizzo argues that the district court erred because there was no admissible evidence
justifying its factual conclusion that the water damage was as a result of either surface water or
water below the surface of the ground. (Appellant's Brief, p. 27.) His bases for this alleged error
are: (1) State Farm had no experts to counter his experts; (2) State Farm employees were not
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qualified to give expert testimony; and (3) the district court relied on Rizzo as an expert and used
his own statements in order to "confirm the court's causation opinions in this case." !d.
As the district court pointed out with respect to State Farm's need for rebuttal experts:
In his opposition to Defendant's summary judgment motion,
Plaintiff notes that Defendant has submitted no expert testimony in
support of its motion. See Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment at 6. However, as Defendant does not dispute the
opinions of Plaintiff's expert regarding the cause of the damage to
Plaintiff's home, it is not necessary, for purposes of the summary
judgment motion, for Defendant to submit the opinions of its own
expert regarding this issue.
(R., p. 849, fn. 2.) This is factually accurate and legally correct. Outside the medical malpractice
arena, there is no requirement that the moving party submit expert testimony or opinions on
summary judgment. See Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 894, 120 P.3d 278, 282 (2005). This is
true even if the non-moving party proffers such evidence. !d. There was no error based on State
Farm's lack of expert testimony or opinions.
None of State Farm's employees were offered as or held out to be expert witnesses on
either causation or coverage. All State Farm affidavits merely provided facts and context
underlying these legal issues. (R., pp. 369; 373-77; 383; 427; 723 and 752.) Regardless, even if
these affidavits were offered as expert testimony, the district court did not rely on them as such in
reaching its conclusion on causation or that there was no coverage. (R., pp. 847-58.)
Rizzo's statements were properly considered by the district court and Rizzo was not
converted into an expert regarding either causation or coverage. In confirming there were no
disputed material facts regarding the cause of damage, the district court properly considered
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Rizzo's allegations in his Amended Complaint (R., p. 848); Rizzo's supporting affidavits (/d. at
p. 851, fn. 3); and Rizzo's other statements relating to cause. (/d.) The district court properly did
so in order to show Rizzo's statements were consistent with other evidence regarding the cause
of the water damage and therefore created no genuine issue of material fact. /d.
The district court did rely on Rizzo's factual statements supporting the entrance of water
into the home below the surface of the ground. (R., pp. 851, fn. 3; 783.) However, Rizzo does
not identify when, where or how the district court treated him as an expert. A review of the
record shows he was not treated as such.
The district court gave due consideration to the record in support of summary judgment
including expert witness testimony and opinions and Rizzo's own statements. /d. The district
court did not rely on Rizzo or State Farm employees as expert witnesses. State Farm met its
burden of proof in showing there were no genuine issues of material fact. Rizzo failed to meet
his burden of proof to show otherwise. Alternatively, he failed to establish a prima facie case
making all facts immaterial. The district court properly applied the standards as set forth by Rule
56( c). (R., pp. 847-58.) Once the district court determined there were no genuine issues of
material fact concerning the cause of water damage, the district court properly turned to the
language of the policy. The determination of the legal effect of insurance contract provisions as
applied to undisputed facts are matters of law to be decided by the court. See Fisk, 141 Idaho at
292, 108 P.3d at 992. The district court determined the relevant language in the insurance
contract was unambiguous and then, under the applicable legal principles, applied the language

-13-

to the undisputed material facts. (R., pp. 852-53.) As discussed below, the district court was also
correct in its determination that State Farm was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

2.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary .Judgment on the Breach of
Contract Cause of Action
a.

The Covered Perils Listed Under Coverage B-Personal Property Do Not
Apply to Coverage A-Dwelling Nor Provide Coverage for Rizzo's Claims.

Both of Rizzo's claims were for water damage to his horne. The applicable coverage is
Coverage A- Dwelling. 9
Rizzo contends that the sixteen (16) covered perils listed under Coverage B-Personal
Property are ambiguous and apply to both Coverage A-Dwelling losses and Coverage B-Personal
Property losses. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-29.) Finding an ambiguity that allows these covered
perils to apply to both Coverage A and O;)Verage B is important to Rizzo. It allows him to argue
that certain of the covered perils listed under Coverage B-Personal Property apply to his
Coverage A-Dwelling claims, making them covered claims. They do not apply, but even if they
did, Rizzo's claims are still not covered.
Rizzo argues there is ambiguity because there is no language confining these sixteen (16)
covered perils to one coverage or the other. !d. All sixteen (16) covered perils unambiguously
apply only to Coverage B-Personal Property and are not applicable to Rizzo's May and
December Coverage A-Dwelling claims. The language and format of the language leave no

9

The only claims properly appealed from are the May and December Coverage ADwelling losses. His recent claim under Coverage A-Dwelling and Coverage B-Personal
Property is not properly before this Court. See footnote 1, infra.
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ambiguity. First, under Section I-Losses Insured there are clearly two distinct types of coverage
described- Coverage A-Dwelling and Coverage B-Personal Property. (R., p. 408.)
Second, the insuring language for Coverage A-Dwelling states as follows:
COVERAGE A-DWELLING
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the property
described in Coverage A, except as provided in SECTION ILOSSES NOT INSURED.
!d. The insuring language for Coverage B-Personal Property is different:

COVERAGE B-PERSONAL PROPERTY
We insure for accidental directly physical loss to property
described in Coverage B caused by the following perils, except as
provided in SECTION I-LOSSES NOT INSURED:
!d. (underlining added). Coverage B expressly ties itself to the list of covered perils. Coverage

A does not. There is no language in Coverage A stating "caused by the following perils". (!d. at

p. 408.)
Third, immediately following the colon at the end of the Coverage B insuring language is
the list of sixteen (16) covered perils. (R., pp. 408-10.) There is no colon in the insuring
language for Coverage A. (!d. at p. 408.) There is no list of perils immediately following the
description of Coverage A. !d.
Fourth, the distinct and separate headings and intervening paragraph breaks describing the
distinct and separate coverages also support that there is no ambiguity and that the sixteen (16)
covered perils apply only to Coverage B-Personal Property claims. (R., pp. 411; 852-53.) There
is no reasonable interpretation that can stretch the listed perils under Coverage B-Personal
Property into Coverage A-Dwelling.
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Even if these listed perils apply to Coverage A-Dwelling Losses, the insuring language of
both Coverage A and B refer and are subject to "Section !-Losses Not Insured." (R., p. 408.)
(Underlining added.) Neither Coverage A nor Coverage B insures for any loss caused by any of
the listed perils under "Losses Not Insured". (ld. at p. 410.) Specifically, Rizzo's Policy does
not insure any loss caused by surface water (whether driven by wind or not) or water below the
surface of the ground (including water which exerts pressure on, or seeps or leaks, through a
building or foundation). (ld. at p. 411.) Rizzo's argument that the "windstorm or hail" covered
peril under Coverage B provides coverage for his Coverage A claims is unavailing. It is
undisputed that even if wind or hail was involved, the water damage was caused by surface or
subsurface water. A combination of perils covered and non-covered is not covered under the
concurrent cause exclusion if.!! cause of the damage was surface or subsurface water. (R., pp.
410-411.)
2.

We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which
would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of
the following excluded events. We do not insure for such
loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the excluded event; or
(b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes
acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded
event to produce the loss; and (d) whether the event occurs
suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or widespread
damage, arises from natural or external forces, or occurs as
a result of any combination of these:
c.

Water Damage, meaning:

(/d.. )
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After Hurricane Katrina, the epicenter of water damage cases was the Gulf Coast region.
In those cases, courts have consistently held the same concurrent clause provision set forth above

is unambiguous and precludes coverage where there is a claim of combined events causing
damage to an insured's property. 10 For example, in Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507
F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2007), the court analyzed this concurrent cause provision and held that it
clearly states "that excluded losses -- here, any loss which would not have occurred in the
absence of one or more of the excluded events -- will not be covered even if a nonexcluded event
or peril acts 'concurrently or in any sequence' with the excluded event to cause the loss in
question." !d. at 354. The court further held that "any damage caused exclusively by a
nonexcluded peril or event such as wind, not concurrently or sequentially with water damage, is
covered by the policy, while all damage caused by water or by wind acting concurrently or
sequentially with water, is excluded." !d. (italics in original; emphasis added). The concurrent
cause provision "in combination with the Water Damage Exclusion clearly provides that
indivisible damage caused by both excluded perils and covered perils or other causes is not
covered." !d.; see also In re: Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007)
(affirming the finding that the concurrent cause provision is unambiguous). Without regard to

10

While the Gulf Coast region may be the epicenter of recent cases dealing with the
concurrent cause provision, a majority of jurisdictions have deemed it unambiguous and
enforceable beyond the hurricane context. See, e.g., Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
165 P.3d 900, 904 (Colo. App. 2007) (State Farm water damage exclusion applied "regardless of
the cause and regardless of 'whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the
excluded event to produce the loss"'); Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah
1993) (affirming denial of coverage based upon concurrent cause provision).
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the application of the listed covered perils under Coverage B there is no coverage under
Coverage A-Dwelling because coverage is excepted under "Losses Not Insured" and excluded by
the concurrent cause provision. !d.
No matter how hard Rizzo tries to reclassify the form of the water that caused the damage
to his home, he cannot escape the undisputed facts that it was indeed water that caused the
damage either as rainwater accumulating on the surface of the ground and/or as water entering
his home below the surface of the ground. See, e.g., Kish v. Insurance Co. of North America,
125 Wash.2d 164, 170-71, 883 P.2d 308,311-12 (1994) ("rain is merely another characterization
of flood" and '"[a]n insured may not avoid a contractual exclusion merely by affixing an
additional label or separate characterization to the act or event causing the loss."')
Rizzo argues that the district court ignored his causation expert when it determined that
the damage was caused by surface water and/or water beneath the surface of the ground.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 31.) To the contrary, the district court quoted and relied on Rizzo's
causation expert because he was consistent with the district court's determination there was no
genuine issue of material fact regarding the cause of the damage:
The damage to Rizzo's (sic) home which occurred on May 22,
2010 and December 2010 almost certainly happened because of the
following events. An extremely high level of rainfall collected in a
house window well. This rainwater became one to two feet deep in
the window well. It exerted substantial pressure on the side of the
home and an approximately 18 mile an hour wind blowing in the
right direction against a very large structural wall caused an
opening in the wall. Large amounts of rainfall then penetrated the
wall through the opening and flooded the downstairs floor of the
house.
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(R., pp. 848-49.) When the expert's opinion is coupled with the undisputed facts that the

downstairs floor of the house was a basement; that the basement wall below the window well is
below the surface of the ground; and the rainwater accumulated on the surface before entering the
basement -- the water that caused the damage to the home was either surface water or water
below the surface of the ground, both of which are excluded. (R., p. 851, fn. 3.) It does not
matter whether the damage was caused by surface water or water below the surface of the
ground. It is undisputed that it had to be one or the other or both, any combination of which is
excluded under the concurrent cause provision. 11
Rizzo argues that it was rainwater that caused the damage and rain cannot be surface or
sub-surface water because rain is defined as "water falling in drops from the clouds."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 33.) He further argues that nowhere in the policy does it define rain as
surface or sub-surface water. /d. In addition, Rizzo argues that one of the insured perils listed
under Coverage B supports his argument that rain can be neither and is therefore a covered peril.
/d. at p. 34.

Rizzo's arguments miss the point. The excluded event at issue here is "water damage,"
not rain. (R., p. 411.) It is undisputed that both of Rizzo's losses arise from water damage. (R.,
pp. 157; 724; 735; 736; 850.) "Water damage" is described in the Policy to include many forms
of water. (R., p. 411.) Rizzo is correct that it does not specifically list rain, rainwater or rainfall

11

This is true even if one or the other or both surface water or water below the surface of
the ground was only one of many other causes. The concurrent cause exclusion excludes water
damage regardless. (R., p. 411.)
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or specifically define water damage to mean any of these. The water damage to Rizzo's
basement cannot, however, as a matter of physics, have been caused directly by rain or rain and
wind.
As Rizzo states, rain is "water falling in drops from clouds." (Appellant's Brief, p. 33.)
By definition, rain must become some other form of water once it stops falling. Here, neither
State Farm nor the district court disputed that the water that caused damage to Rizzo's dwelling
began as rain. But, it is also undisputed that the rain did not enter the basement directly as water
falling in drops from the clouds (the basement was covered by the first floor of the home). The
rain fell outside the dwelling, accumulated outside the dwelling and either flowed from the
surface into the basement or percolated into the ground and entered below the surface. That the
water was once rain or that the rain was affected by wind does not establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to coverage.
The learned treatise, CoucH ON INSURANCE 3rd, well describes the distinction between
surface water and rain with respect to coverage:
Surface water is water diffused over the surface of the land. Any
water on the earth's surface, including water from rising
groundwater, may be surface water unless or until it forms some
more definite body of water. Typically, surface water is created by
rain or other precipitation. However, though it is derived from
rain, surface water is distinguished from rain by its character as
water on the ground. Rain, on the other hand, has been defined as
'water falling from the sky.'
Using these definitions, damage from water flowing on the earth
onto the insured's property, or into the insured's building, will
generally constitute damage from surface water. Damage from
water naturally falling from the sky onto the insured's property, or
-20-

into the insured's building, will generally constitute damage from
ram.
11 CoucH ON INSURANCE, 3rd § 153:50 (footnotes omitted). No rainwater fell from the clouds
directly into the basement. Based on the facts constmed in the light most favorable to Rizzo -the rainwater became surface water when it accumulated in Rizzo's window well and then
flowed into his basement. Water damage from surface water is excluded. (R., p. 411.)
Recent appellate cases from other jurisdictions prove, by example, that water damage
caused by water that was originally rain is not a covered loss once the rain hits the earth's surface
or seeps into the ground. The district court here agreed with the reasoning in one of these cases.
The Court notes that, when interpreting a homeowners policy
containing similar exclusion language, the Illinois Court of
Appeals concluded that water which had accumulated in a window
well met the definition of "surface water." See Smith v. Union
Auto. Indem. Co., 752 N.E. 2d 1261 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001). After
reviewing dictionary definitions as well as case law from various
jurisdictions, the Smith court concluded that "surface water means
water derived from natural precipitation that flows over or
accumulates on the ground without forming a definite body of
water or following a defined watercourse." /d. at 1268. The Smith
court rejected the insureds' contention that surface water is limited
to water that is "unaffected by man-made constmctions." /d.
Although the Smith case is not binding authority, the Court agrees
with the reasoning set forth by the Illinois Court of Appeals.
(R., pp. 851-52, fn. 4.)

In Bao v. Liberty Mutl. Ins. Co., 535 F.Supp.2d 532 (D.Md. 2008), the Court determined

that a pool of rainwater that accumulated in a basement stairwell was "surface water" within the
meaning of the water damage exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy which excluded loss
caused directly or indirectly by water damage. /d. at 535-6. The Court carne to this conclusion
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even though rainwater was not specifically mentioned in the losses not insured provision of the
Policy. !d.
Similarly, in American Family Mutl. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 793 N.W.2d 111 (Wis. Ct. App.
20 10), the Court defined surface water as water derived from falling rain or melting snow
diffused over the surface of the ground to be eventually lost by evaporation, percolation, or
natural drainage. !d. at 273. Based on that well established meaning the Court held that the
water damage exclusion applied to water that entered a two foot space between the insured's
existing crawlspace foundation and a new basement wall during heavy rain fall reasoning that the
water was surface water flowing on the earth, not rainwater falling from the sky. !d. at 275-6.
Idaho cases, in contexts other than insurance coverage, have also distinguished between
rain and surface water and found, not unsurprisingly, that the former becomes the latter once it
stops falling. Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 103, 524 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1974) (" ... the
surface water from rain and melting snow percolated into this ground .... "). See also Union
Central Life Ins. Co. v. Albrethsen, 50 Idaho 196, 202,294 P. 842, 844-45 (1930) (" ... the land
owner, by means of dams and embankments, had collected surface and flood waters, coming
entirely from seasonal rains and melting snows ....").
The meaning of surface water is clear, well established and unambiguous. As applied to
the undisputed facts, the rain became surface water once it accumulated in the window well.
Losses are not insured if the damage was caused by surface water. (R., p. 411.)

-22-

Even if the water was not surface water, the only other reasonable source of the water
damage is from water below the surface of the ground. COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d discusses
subsurface water in the context of insurance coverage as follows:
A particular policy may exclude coverage for damage caused by
subsurface water. Such water may be characterized as subsurface
water, water beneath the ground, or underground water. The scope
of the exclusion in each case will depend on the particular
language used.
There is not generally dispute over the definition of subsurface
water. Subsurface water is water beneath the ground, or
subterranean water. There is, however, some dispute over whether
the exclusion encompasses only underground water from natural
sources, such as precipitation, or extends to water from artificial
sources, such as broken pipes.
Some courts hold that the exclusion only applies to damage from
natural sources of subsurface water. Thus subsurface water would
encompass 'tmderground streams, springs or natural deposits of
liquid,' and would not extend to subsurface water from artificial
sources.

Other courts, however, consider damage from subsurface water to
fall within the exclusion regardless of the character of the water's
source. This interpretation follows from policy language excluding
damage from 'water below the surface of the ground,' without
regard for the source of the water.
11 CoucH ON INSURANCE 3d,§ 153:58. Rizzo's Policy has the more inclusive "water below the
surface of the ground" language eliminating any need to speculate about the source of the water.
Regardless, there is no dispute- the water at issue came from a natural source -rain. If surface
water was not the cause of the water damage, it is because it percolated and seeped below the
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surface of the ground and flowed or leaked into Rizzo's basement. Water damage caused by
subsurface water is also excluded. (R., p. 411.)
A New York appellate court discussed the same subsurface water exclusion as found in
Rizzo's Policy in a factual context nearly identical to this case. Neuman v. United Services Auto
Assoc., 905 N.Y.S. 2d 202, 203 (2d Dept. 2010). The Court observed that the loss to the
insured's home was caused by rainwater that seeped from the soil through the basement wall. /d.
at 203. An excluded peril under the insured's homeowners policy excluded coverage for loss
caused "by ... water below the surface of the ground, including water which exerts pressure on
or seeps or leaks through a building, ... foundation, ... or other structure." /d. The exclusion
was upheld and the loss was deemed to be excluded. /d. The same excluded peril (or loss not
insured) is found in Rizzo's Policy. If the policy language is applied as written the same result
should occur here - no coverage.
b.

The Exclusions in the Policy Do Not Make Coverage Illusory.

It appears that Rizzo is arguing that the concurrent cause provision of the Losses Not

Insured portion of the Policy makes coverage illusory. (Appellant's Brief, p. 32.) Specifically,
he argues that this exclusion is all encompassing and defeats all coverage claims and therefore
cannot be used to prevent coverage for his claims. (/d. at pp. 32-33.)
A policy is illusory only if it appears there is no actual coverage or it is extremely
minimal and affords no realistic protection to any group or class of insured persons. Martinez v.
Idaho Counties Reciprocal Management Program, 134 Idaho 247, 252, 999 P.2d 902, 907
(2000). Conversely, where coverage is not minimal and does provide realistic protections to
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those defined as insureds, the policy is not illusory. National Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v.

Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 542, 112 P.3d 825, 830 (2005).
The exclusions at issue here do not remove completely or even mostly any coverage to
insureds, including Rizzo. The "losses not insured" are specific and of limited number. (R., p.
411.) The insuring language for Coverage A insures for "accidental direct physical loss to the
property" and only excepts those losses expressly delineated as not insured. /d. Accidental
direct physical loss to Rizzo's home in the form of fire damage, explosion, a vehicle running into
the dwelling, or lightening could be deemed a covered loss, notwithstanding the concurrent cause
provision in the exclusions section. Rizzo would have been covered under the Policy had he
suffered a covered loss, of which there are many. The fact that Rizzo's claims are not covered
does not make the insurance policy illusory. The coverage provided by his policy is not minimal
and it does provide realistic protection for numerous types of claims, just not those presented
here.
c.

The Coverage "Denial" Letters Cannot Constitute a Breach of Contract.

Rizzo argues that certain letters sent to him by State Farm employees, referred to as
"denial of coverage letters," were confusing, ambiguous, violated various provisions of the Idaho
insurance code and therefore were a breach of the Policy contract. 12 At no time before the district

12

To clarify the record, the so-called "denial letter" dated June 10, 2010, is not a denial
letter. (R., p. 451-454.) It is a reservation of rights letter that was issued during the pendency of
the investigation. /d. at p. 451. In fact, the letter specifically states "[t]his is not to be construed
as a denial of your claim. The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge there are coverage
questions with regard to your loss." (R., p. 453.)
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comt did Rizzo claim that the coverage denial letters constituted a breach of contract. Although
he discusses the denial letters in the context of tortuous (sic) conduct (R., p. 12), bad faith (R., p.
16), violation of statutes (R., p. 103), and punitive damages (R., p. 203) he has never previously
argued that these letters breached the insurance contract. As a new issue on appeal, the "denial
letters" as a breach of contract should be disregarded. KEB Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140
Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2004). Second, there is no provision in the insurance policy
dictating what a denial letter should or should not say. (R., pp. 386-426.) In fact, there is no
contract provision relating to denial letters whatsoever. Id. Consequently, even if the letters
were as described by Rizzo, none of these denial letters can constitute or form the basis for a
breach of contract, express or implied. This so-called breach cannot be used to overturn the grant
of summary judgment on the breach of contract cause of action.
d.

The Alleged Violations of Idaho Statutory and Supreme Court Law
Regarding Insurance Policy Interpretation Do Not Constitute a Breach of
Contract.

Rizzo argues State Farm breached the insurance policy by violating certain provisions of
the Idaho Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (Idaho Code§ 41-1329) (the "Act") and by
violating this Court's insurance contract interpretation cases. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 36-37.)
Violations of the Act do not provide the basis for a breach of contract cause of action. White v.
Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 1020-1,730 P.2d 1014, 100-1 (1986). An insured cannot
sue the insurer for statutory violations in connection with the settlement of the insured's claim.
Id. Rizzo's argument that these statutory violations could form the basis of a breach of contract
cause of action, made in the face of longstanding Idaho case law, should be rejected.
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This Court's contract interpretation case cited by Rizzo does not support the proposition
that State Farm breached the insurance contract by not using clear and precise language and not
construing the policy in his favor. (Appellant's Brief, p. 37 (citing Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co.

of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,462, 180 P.3d 498, 501 (2008).) Arreguin sets forth he rules by which a
court interprets an insurance policy after an insurer has settled or denied a claim and after a
lawsuit has been filed. Arreguin, 145 Idaho at 180, P.3d at 501. It does not establish a standard
to be used by insurers when investigating and settling claims. This frivolous and unsupportable
argument should be rejected.

3.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary .Judgment on the Bad Faith
Cause of Action.

The district court granted summary judgment on the bad faith cause of action on the
ground that there was no coverage and therefore no breach of contract, and if there was no breach
of contract there can be no cause of action for bad faith, as a matter of law. (R., p. 854.) This is
consistent with Idaho case law. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 179,
45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002). 13 If the breach of contract dismissal is upheld, so must the dismissal of
bad faith. If the breach of contract dismissal if overturned, State Farm agrees that the bad faith
cause of action should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

13

Rizzo' s arguments on appeal regarding the elements of bad faith, tortious conduct,
claims handling, genuine issues of material fact and expert testimony are irrelevant to the
dismissal of the bad faith cause of action. The district court dismissed this cause of action solely
on the ground that the prerequisite of coverage did not exist. (R., p. 854.) No other bad faith
issues were considered by the district court and therefore cannot be considered on appeal.
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4.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

The district court dismissed the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cause of action on the grounds that there can be no violation of this implied covenant if
the insurance contract does not provide coverage. (R., p. 855.) The district court is correct.
In Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n., 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005) this Court
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on the claim of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 368, 109
P.3d at 1110. This Court reasoned that because there was not an enforceable agreement, there
was no obligation imposed by the agreement that the parties were required to perform in good
faith. Id. Similarly, this Court has concluded that a claim of breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing fails since that claim depends for its existence on the success of the
contract claim. Sorensen v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 760,
118 P.3d 86, 92 (2005). Without coverage State Farm had no obligations to perform, in good
faith or otherwise. Without coverage there is no benefit or right to be impaired by State Farm. If
the breach of contract cause of action was properly dismissed, the dismissal of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of action must also be upheld.
On the other hand, even if dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action is reversed,
the dismissal of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of action should be
upheld. There is no cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing separate and distinct from breach of contract. See Idaho Fist Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley
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Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991). In Bliss Valley Foods, this Court
stated:
Since the covenant of good faith is a "covenant ... implied in the
contract" under our Metcalf, Sorensen and Burton cases and only
requires the parties to perform in good faith the obligations
contained in their agreement, the covenant is only violated when
"action by either party ... violates, nullifies or significantly
impairs any benefit of the ... contract." Metcalf v. Intermountain
Gas Co., supra; Sorensen v. Comm Tek, supra. A violation of the
implied covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result in a
cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims, nor
does it result in separate contract damages unless such damages
specifically relate to the breach of the good faith covenant. To
hold otherwise would result in a duplication of damages awarded
for breach of the same contract. ...
!d. (Emphasis added.) As a duplicative cause of action, that could result in a duplication of
contract damages, Rizzo's cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith was
correctly dismissed, as a matter of law.
In addition, while there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all

contracts, in the insurer-insured context, this Court has created the tort of bad faith and
established the specific elements that must be proven before an insured may recover tort damages
for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In White v.

Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986), this Court held that "where an
insurer 'intentionally and unreasonably denies or delays payment' on a claim, and in the process
harms the claimant in such a way not fully compensable at contract, the claimant can bring an
action in tort to recover for the harm done." White, 112 Idaho at 98, 730 P.2d at 1018. The tort
of bad faith arises out of the insurer's "duty to act in good faith with their insureds." White, 112
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Idaho at 96, 730 P.2d at 1016 (citation omitted). "If that duty is breached, instead of treating the
claim as a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the guise of a contract
claim, the Court has held that an action can be brought as a tort claim." Robinson, 137 Idaho at
179,45 P.3d at 835 (emphasis added). Consequently, breach of this implied covenant has been
subsumed within the bad faith cause of action.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is either duplicative of a breach of
contract or subsumed by a bad faith cause of action and cannot stand on its own as a separate
cause of action.

5.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary .Judgment on the Negligence
Per Se Cause of Action.

The district court granted summary judgment on the negligence per se cause of action on
the ground that Rizzo failed to demonstrate a material issue of fact as to whether State Farm's
conduct constituted a "breach" of Idaho Code§ 41-113(2). (R., pp. 855-856.) There is no need
to examine State Farm's conduct or to determine whether there are material issues of fact or even
to examine whether the statute was breached. The dismissal of this cause of action should be
affirmed because there is no separate, stand alone cause of action for negligence per se and there
is no private cause of action for violating the insurance code.
Negligence per se is not an independent cause of action to be pleaded separately from a
negligence claim. Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 898-99, 188 P.3d 834
(2008) reh 'g denied. Rather, negligence per se lessens the plaintiff's burden on the issue of the
actor's departure from the standard of conduct required of a reasonable man, taking the elements
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of duty and breach away from the jury. O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d
308 (2005) (citations omitted). Rizzo did not bring a negligence claim. The negligence per se
cause of action was properly dismissed, as a matter of law.
Regardless, Plaintiff's claim for negligence per se is based on allegations that Defendant
violated the following statute pertaining to insurers:
The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest,
requiring that all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from
deception, and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters.
Upon the insurer, the insured, and their representatives, and all
concerned in the insurance transactions, rests the duty of
preserving the integrity of insurance.
Idaho Code§ 41-113(2). (R., p. 855.) In Idaho, the sole cause of action for an insurer's failure
to act in good faith, to act deceptively, or fail to act with honesty and equity towards its insured is
a cause of action for bad faith. See White v. Unigard Mutual Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 94,.101,
730 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986). In White, the insured sought to establish a private right of action
under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, which expressly prohibits unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance. Id.; see also
Idaho Code§ 41-1329. 14 Specifically, the Court in White was asked to determine whether there
is "a private right of action under Idaho's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, Idaho Code§
41-1329 (1977), whereby an insured can sue the insurer for statutory violations committed in

14

Idaho Code§ 41-1329 provides in relevant part: "Pursuant to section 41-1302, Idaho
Code, committing or performing any of the following acts or omissions intentionally, or with
such frequency as to indicate a general business practice shall be deemed to be an unfair method
of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance."
(Emphasis added.)
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connection with the settlement of the insured's claim." !d. at 95, 730 P.2d at 1015. The answer
was "No". !d. at 101, 730 P.2d at 1021. The Court declined to create a cause of action against
insurers for statutory violations committed in connection with the settlement of insureds' claims
because the court established the tort of bad faith instead. !d. Since "there is a common law duty
on the part of insurers to their insured to settle the first party claims of their insured in good faith
and that a breach of that duty will give rise to an action in tort, we find that a statutory remedy is
neither prescribed nor necessary." !d. The dismissal of this cause of action should be affirmed
for the same reason.

6.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on the Failure to
Warn Cause of Action.

Rizzo alleges that State Farm had a duty to warn he and his wife of the health hazards
faced when rainwater entered his home and "likely" formed mold and fungus. (R., pp. 16-17.)
The district court dismissed this cause of action on the grounds that Rizzo failed to establish that
State Farm had such a duty to warn and because losses associated with mold are excluded from
coverage. (R., p. 856.) This cause of action is yet another disguised breach of contract or bad
faith cause of action.
To the extent there is a duty to warn, it must arise from the express or implied contract
provisions, statutes or the "special relationship" formed between an insurer and insured. Rizzo
has failed to point to a single, express provision in the insurance contract that establishes a
requirement to warn insureds of possible health hazards arising out of a property damage claim.
(R., pp. 386-426.) There can be no cause of action for failure to warn based on the insurance
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policy. There are no statutes requiring insurance companies to warn of health hazards that may
arise from a loss. To the extent Rizzo's alleged duty to warn arises out of the "special
relationship" between an insurer and insured, he once again ignores the sole cause of action for
any such conduct- bad faith. Because bad faith has been limited to delay or denial of payment
Rizzo has pointed to no source for this so called duty to warn of health hazards. There is none
because the duty does not exist. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 178,
45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002).
Even if there was a duty to warn Rizzo of possible health hazards, any loss arising from a
breach of that duty is not covered. As discussed above, the concurrent cause provision excludes
coverage for any losses under any coverage if i! cause of damages is surface or subsurface water.
Moreover, this Court has never before extended any duty of any kind owed by an insurer
to its insured relating to an uncovered claim. See White, 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014. There can
be no duty to warn of consequences arising out of an uncovered claim.
Finally, Rizzo's reliance upon Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of America, 112 Idaho 277, 731
P.2d 1267 (1986), in support of his argument that State Farm owed him a duty to warn is
misplaced. Sliman was a products liability case where the Court recognized the following duty to
warn:
In the context of both negligence and strict liability, a
supplier in some situations has the duty to warn of risks from its
products. In an action based on negligence, this Court has held:

As a general rule, if any supplier, including the
distributor, of a product knows or has reason to
know that the product is likely to be unsafe when
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used for the purpose for which it is supplied, and
has no reason to believe that the persons for whose
use the product was supplied will realize its unsafe
condition, then the supplier has a duty to exercise
reasonable care adequately to warn them of the
unsafe condition or of the facts which make the
product likely to be dangerous.
Sliman, 112 Idaho at 280, 731 P.2d at 1270 (emphasis added). The duty to warn of unsafe
products does not apply in the insurer-insured context. An insurance policy is not a product used
by the insured or a product that can contain an unsafe condition.
Rizzo cannot support his failure to warn claim with any recognized duty. Even if there
was a duty to warn, any loss for failure to do so is not covered. Dismissal of the negligence pre
se cause of action should be affirmed.

7.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying, in Part, the
Motion to Amend the Complaint.

It should be noted at the outset that the motion to amend the complaint was not denied in
its entirety. The district court granted the motion to amend to add the claim for failure to warn
and to include the December loss. (R., pp. 17-18; 544; 556.) 15
The standard of review for denying a motion to amend the complaint is abuse of
discretion. See infra, p. 8. Rizzo has failed to acknowledge this standard of review and

15

The original complaint was based only on the May loss. (R., p. 10.) The motion to
amend the complaint sought to add the December loss. (R., p. 547.) State Farm did not object to
including this second loss and the district court allowed it. (!d.) Rizzo followed the proper
procedure for adding the December loss but did not for the third claim. This highlights the
frivolousness and disingenuousness of Rizzo's constant reference on appeal to a third claim for
dwelling and personal property damage.
-34-

consequently has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the
motion to amend the complaint to add claims for punitive damages, diminution in value and
personal injury. Instead, Rizzo simply disagrees with the court's ruling based primarily on his
"belief' that there was coverage. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 44-46.) For this reason alone, the
district court's denial of the motion to amend the complaint should be affirmed.
a.

The District Court Properly Denied the Motion to Amend to Include a
Prayer for Punitive Damages.

The district court concluded that Rizzo failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of
proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages as required by Idaho
Code§ 6-1604(2). (R., p. 553.) The district court noted that there were differing opinions
regarding coverage and consequently Rizzo provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate his
ability to establish the requisite intersection of "a bad act and a bad state of mind" regarding State
Farm's conduct in handling his claims. /d. Rizzo has done nothing to show how the district
court abused its discretion in coming to its ruling on this portion of the motion to amend.
Rizzo does argue that the district court ignored his "coverage" expert Strezlec. The
district did, however, consider the expert's coverage opinion regarding whether the loss was
covered. (R., pp. 552-553.) Having considered this expert's opinion the district court still found
that Rizzo failed to meet the prerequisites to a punitive damage claim. (/d. at p. 553.)
Regardless of whether the district court abused its discretion, the motion to amend to add
a claim for punitive damages was properly denied as a matter of law. In the breach of contract
context there must be an egregious breach of the contract to get to punitive damages. General
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Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 853, 979 P.2d 1207, 1211 (1999). A
"breach of contract by itself is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages." !d. The
obvious extension of this holding is that if there is no breach of contract there can be no basis for
punitive damages under contract law.
As the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized in the bad faith tort context, if there is no
coverage there can be no punitive damages:
By parity of reasoning, we also reject Greene's contention that the
insurance company's conduct warrants an imposition of punitive
damages. To recover punitive damages for denial of an insurance
claim, the insured must show (1) that the company initially refused
to pay a valid claim, (2) that the company's refusal to make prompt
payment was an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of
conduct, and (3) that this extreme deviation occurred with an
understanding of the probable consequences. [citations omitted.]
Here, because Greene's claim was "fairly debatable," we deem it
clear that the company's refusal to pay the claim promptly was not
"an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct."
Greene v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 114 Idaho 63, 68, 753 P.2d 274, 279 (1988). (Emphasis added.)
Here, because Rizzo's claims were not covered at all, there was no refusal to pay a valid claim
and therefore there could be no refusal to promptly pay the claims and, therefore, no extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct. By parity of reasoning, there is no tort basis
warranting an imposition of ptmitive damages.
Rizzo also asserts that State Farm's conduct violated certain insurance statutes, including
Idaho Code§ 41-1329, and therefore punitive damages should be imposed for that reason. The
Greene Court addressed a similar argument as follows:
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The facts in this case would afford a tenuous basis to find a
violation of section 41-1329. However, we need not make a
definitive mling on that question. In White v. Unigard Mutual
Insurance Co., supra, our Supreme Court- after holding that a tort
of bad faith exists in Idaho- went on to declare that private
remedies under the Idaho Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act
are unnecessary and, therefore, will be deemed not to exist. Thus,
as interpreted by our Supreme Court, section 41-1329 may furnish
grounds for administrative action against an insurance company, or
for the government to seek judicial relief from certain unfair
practices, but it "does not give rise to a private right of action
whereby an insured can sue an insurer for statutory violations
committed in connection with the settlement of the insured's
claim." White, 112 Idaho at 101, 730 P.2d at 1021. ...
Greene, 114 Idaho at 68-9, 753 P.2d at 279-80. Rizzo's request to add a claim for punitive is
based on "direct violations" of the Act and other insurance code sections. This is not a proper
basis for a claim for punitive damages.
If the dismissal of breach of contract and bad faith causes of action are upheld it would

be futile to allow the complaint to be amended to add a claim for punitive damages. Rizzo has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend the
complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. There was no such abuse because the district
court recognized his discretion in mling on the motion, applied the correct legal standard and did
not exceed the outer boundaries of that standard. (R., p. 533.) Not only was there no abuse of
discretion, the denial was proper and should be affirmed.
b.

The District Court Properly Denied the Motion to Amend to Add
Diminution of Value and Personal Injury Causes of Action.

The district court denied the motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for diminution
of value and a claim for personal injury on the ground that to allow the amendment would be
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futile because "neither the record nor the Proposed Amended Complaint sets forth any
allegations that would support such claims." (R., p. 555.) Rizzo fails to point to any allegations
that might indeed support these claims and for this reason alone the district court should be
affirmed. Regardless, another form of futility is a failure to state a cause of action with the
proposed amendment. Spur Products, 142 Idaho at 44, 122 P.3d at 303.
On appeal Rizzo challenges the diminution of value ruling based on the conclusory
statement that "[u]nquestionably, Plaintiff's home has diminished in value because of the wind
and rain storms damaging the house and property within it" and upon his belief that "all such
damage was covered" by the Policy. (Appellant's Brief, p. 45.) Rizzo fails to cite to the record
to support these conclusory arguments that the dwelling and his personal property "have
significantly deteriorated" with the passage of time and is due to State Farm's refusal to pay for
these damages. (ld. at p. 46.) Nor does he cite to the record to support his claimed devaluation
damages. /d. Without record support these arguments should be disregarded.
Rizzo argues in support of his personal injury cause of action that "he may have also
suffered unknown physical injuries or will sustain physical injuries in the future." /d. This
argument supports the district court's denial of the inclusion of this cause of action.
In his Proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that
Defendant's failure to warn Plaintiff of the health hazards
associated with flooding damage "may have" caused Plaintiff "to
suffer physical injuries, which have not yet been identified....

However, neither the record nor the Proposed Amended Complaint
sets forth any allegations that would support such claims. Plaintiff
has merely stated that his own research "indicated that it is .YS:IY
likely mold and fungus formed in the house wall that rainwater
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flooded through. Particles of mold and fungus then probably
permeated the air in parts" of the home. Because the record
contains no allegations or evidence regarding the actual presence of
mold or fungus in Plaintiff's home as a result of the flooding
damage, the Court concludes that Plaintiff should not be permitted
to add claims for personal injuries or diminution in value related to
the presence of mold in the home.
(R., p. 554-55 (citing to Proposed Amended Complaint).) Allegations based on possibilities, not
yet identified injuries and potential future injuries cannot support a claim for relief. See Wackerli
v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400,404, 353 P.2d 782, 784 (1960).
If the dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action is affirmed the denial of the
motion to amend the complaint is moot. If there is no coverage for water damage there can be no
coverage for a diminution in value or personal injuries caused by the water damage. Even if the
dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action is reversed, the denial of this motion can be
affirmed. Rizzo's arguments on appeal in no manner show an abuse of discretion by the court in
denying the motion to amend the complaint to add these two claims. Indeed, Rizzo simply
disagrees with the district court's coverage decision based on conclusory statements unsupported
by the record.

8.

The District Court Properly Granted State Farm's Motion for Protective
Order.

State Farm sought a protective order against responding to written discovery in the form
of interrogatories, requests for production of documents and requests for admissions. (R., p. 80.)
Specifically, State Farm sought to limit its responses to pending discovery to matters relevant to
Rizzo's claims and the causes of action then pleaded. (R., pp. 82-95.) State Farm also sought to
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preclude discovery related to State Farm's financial strength/status and to preclude the Rizzos
from conducting overbroad discovery in the future. !d. After the issues were fully briefed and a
hearing was held, the district court granted the motion for protective order. (R., p. 483.)
Rizzo seeks to overturn the district court's granting of this motion for protective order
because he was looking for evidence to ascertain the frequency of "such practices" to establish
State Farm's violation of insurance industry standards and to establish State Farm's statewide
misconduct against its insureds. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 47-48.) His stated purpose for this
discovery is to correct the misconduct of State Farm, "presumably" uncover evidence which he
can use to prove his case, and to cause State Farm to reevaluate the way it handles claims. (!d. at
p. 48.)
Rizzo has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in granting the
protective order. See Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104, 996 P.2d 798, 804 (2000)
(A court's decision to grant a protective order is discretionary and is not subject to being
overturned absent an abuse of discretion). For instance, he has in no manner established that
summary judgment was granted against him because he was unable to conduct the protected
discovery. Nor has he shown that he was denied any discovery that would have supported his
foundational claim of breach of contract claim. If he cannot prove a breach of contract there can
be no abuse of discretion in granting the protective order.
Regardless, the district court properly granted the protective order because Rizzo did not
meet his burden of showing why he needed the discovery. Relevance, or the likelihood of
discovering relevant evidence, is not met by a desire to help others who have been wronged or to
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force the opponent to act in a certain way. The former ignores the fact that this is not a class
action suit. The latter is merely using discovery to harass and annoy. "Presumably" uncovering
evidence to support his case does not meet the burden of showing a need for the discovery.
Without more, it merely establishes a fishing expedition.

9.

State Farm is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal.

State Farm requests that it be awarded attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839(4). This statute provides authority for an award of attorney
fees when this Court finds that the appeal was "brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." !d. Idaho Code§ 41-1839(4) provides a basis for an
award of attorney fees to either the insured or the insurer. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132
Idaho 705, 711, 979 P.2d 107, 113 (1999). A case is considered frivolously appealed "if the law
is well settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing that the district court
misapplied the law." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148
( 1999). Here, the law regarding each of the causes of action is well settled and was correctly
applied by the district court.
An award of fees is also appropriate where an appeal presents no meaningful issue on a
question of law but simply invites the appellate court to second guess the district court on
conflicting evidence. Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 828, 41
P.3d 242, 256 (2001). Rizzo has presented no meaningful issue on a question of law. The
evidence that State Farm breached the contract does not even rise to the level of conflicting
evidence. The appeal is instead a request of this Court to second guess the district court's
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application of undisputed facts to the unambiguous terms of the insurance contract and to ignore
well established law without any good reason for doing so. State Farm is entitled to fees and
costs on appeal because it was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and/or without
foundation.

IV. CONCLUSION
Respondent requests the Court affirm the district court's dismissal of all causes of action
in Rizzo's Amended Complaint. Respondent further requests the Court affirm the denial of
Rizzo's motion to amend his complaint and to affirm the grant of State Farm's protective order.
Lastly, Respondent requests attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 41-1839(4) for this
frivolous, unreasonable and/or unsupportable appeal.
DATED this

Y-J>

day of June, 2012.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

e
omson, of the firm
to eys for Defendant/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Z-10 day of June, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:

~S.Mail

Roger Daniel Rizzo
1583 North Sundown Way
Eagle, ID 83616

_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
Facsimile
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